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Abstract
One of the most studied topics in the corporate ﬁnance literature is the effect of ﬁnancial constraints on ﬁrms’
investments decisions. Tryingto explainthis issue, Almeida, Campello and Weisbach(2003) modeled therelationship
between the ﬁnancial constraints faced by ﬁrms and their demand for liquidity. They show that if one ﬁrm is ﬁnancial
constrained we must expect positive cash ￿ow sensitivity from cash windfalls, while for unconstrained ﬁrms this
relation does not hold. The aim of this article is to check this proposition using annual data of 336 non-ﬁnancial
Brazilian public ﬁrms, from 1993 to 2002. Our results show that ﬁnancial constrained Brazilian ﬁrms presented
a positive relationship between cash ￿ow increases and variations of cash holdings. We also suggest that credit
constraints in Brazil are directly related to the size of ﬁrms.
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Resumo
Umdostópicosmaisestudadosemﬁnançascoporativaséoefeitodasrestriçõesﬁnanceirassobreosinvestimentos
das ﬁrmas. Tentando explicar esta questão Almeida, Campello e Weisbach (2003) modelaram a relação entre as
restriçõesﬁnanceiraseademandaporliquidezdasempresas. Elesmostramqueseumaﬁrmaencontra-serestritaentão
deveríamos observar um aumento das variações de caixa quando as ﬁrmas obtémlucros extraordinários, enquanto isto
não seria válido para as ﬁrmas irrestritas ﬁnanceiramente. Neste artigo, buscamos veriﬁcar esta proposição usando
dados anuais de 336 empresas abertas brasileiras e não-ﬁnanceiras, de 1993 até 2002. Os resultados mostraram que
esta relação positiva é válida também para as empresas brasileiras. Por ﬁm, argumentamos que as restrições de crédito
no Brasil estão ligadas ao tamanho das ﬁrmas.
Palavras-Chaves: Restrição de Crédito, Política de Caixa, Firmas Brasileiras.
JEL: D23, G31, G32.
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11 Introduction
Theroleofﬁnancialconstraintsonthechoicesofinvestmentsmadebyﬁrmsisanimportantﬁeldofresearch
on corporate ﬁnance. The main point investigated by economists in this ﬁeld is the fact that ﬁnancially
constrained ﬁrms will not choose the optimal level of investment, being more speciﬁcally, the constrained
ﬁrms will underinvest. At the same time, economists have stressed the importance of a liquid balance sheet
since it allows implementation of new proﬁtable projects when they arise.
The gap between these two standpoints (underinvestment and preference for liquidity) is clear: the
choices of liquidity made by ﬁrms are directly linked to credit restrictions faced by organizations. If a ﬁrm
is ﬁnancially constrained, it tends to hold more liquid assets for precautionary reasons. Otherwise, if the
ﬁrm is not ﬁnancially constrained, it will not hold too much liquid assets because the ﬁrm may borrow
money if it becomes necessary.
Apossible waytostudythis relationshipbetweencashholdings andinvestment is theuseof the liquidity
choices (or the savings variations) as a proxy for investment decisions. However, the economic literature
concerning the role of credit constraints on ﬁrms’ investments have focused on the investment demand.
Fazzari et al. (1988) presented the ﬁrst in￿uential framework in this way1. The idea was to relate the
investments made by ﬁrms to internal funds, hoping to ﬁnd a positive relation for credit-constrained ﬁrms.
But this approach, had led to theoretical and empirical problems.
On the theoretical side, Kaplan and Zingales (1997) question the usefulness the relationship investment-
cashasameasureosﬁnancialconstraints,theyarguethatFazzarietal. (1988)resultisnotnecessaryimplied
by a ﬁnancial constraint situation2. On the empirical side, Erickson and Whited (2000) show that a possible
difference in the investments cash ￿ow sensitivities across groups of constrained and unconstrained ﬁrms
canbeexplainedbyanempiricalframeworkwheretheinvestmentisafunctionofinvestmentsopportunities,
and these opportunities are computed in a wrong measure. Alti (2003) show that cash ￿ows contain much
valuable information about ﬁrms’ opportunities of investments, more precisely, the author demonstrates
that results obtained by Fazzari et al. (1988) can be also obtained in a model without ﬁnancing constraints
(see also Gomes (2001)).
More recently, Almeida, Campello and Weisbach (2003), hereafter ACW, trying to avoid these prob-
lems, developed a theoretical model where ﬁrm’s demand for liquidity depends on its ﬁnancial position. In
the ACW setup, if the ﬁrm anticipates that it will be constrained in future periods, the best strategy is to
hold more cash today. Therefore, constrained ﬁrms will manage their cashes balancing the expected proﬁts
of the current and future investments. Using this approach is possible to estimate the effects of the ﬁnancial
constraint on ﬁrms’ investments using the effects of ﬁnancial constraint on ﬁrms’ savings decisions. The
model predicts that constrained ﬁrms will save more cash when they receive extraordinary amounts of cash
(cash windfalls): they will present a positive cash ￿ow sensitivity of cash. Rather, the unconstrained ﬁrms
will not display a predetermined behavior facing cash windfalls.
ACW used an empirical model to test this prediction, using a sample of manufacturing American ﬁrms
between 1971 and 2000. They conﬁrmed the model predictions implementing empirical tests using ﬁve
distinct ﬁnancial criteria to separate the ﬁrms among constrained and unconstrained ﬁrms.
In this paper we will use the methodology developed by ACW in order to estimate the Brazilian ﬁrms’
savings sensitivity to cash windfalls. In addition, we will discuss the applicability of ACW criteria used to
split the sample into constrained and unconstrained ﬁrms for the Brazilian case.
1Terra (2003) provides an empirical investigation for Brazilian ﬁrms using this methodology.
2See also Povel and Raith (2001) and Almeida and Campello (2002).
2From the ﬁve criteria used by them, only three were feasible to use with Brazilian ﬁrms data. Interest-
ingly two criteria proved to be useful, and using these two, the results obtained by us were perfectly aligned
with those obtained by ACW.
This paper aims to stress the importance of the comparative analysis between samples. To use this
new method to Brazilian data is important because Brazilian and American ﬁrms face different institutional
arrangement with respect to ﬁnancial systems. It’s well known that Brazilian credit market is more restric-
tive, when compered to the American market, in the sense even ﬁrms listed on São Paulo Stock Exchange
(Bovespa) face credit constraints. Moreover, our results, being aligned with those obtainded by ACW,
contributes to conﬁrm the importance of the theoretical model and the recent debate in this area.
The rest of the article is organized as follow. Section 2 describes the theoretical model used by Almeida,
Campello and Weisbach (2003) and its main predictions. In Section 3 the empirical model is developed and
the expected results are brie￿y commented. Section 4 presents the sample and data used on the empiri-
cal part. Section 5 explains the estimation procedures used and reports the main results. Finally, some
concluding remarks are done.
2 Analytical Framework
Many different models are available in the literature studying the effects of ﬁnancial constraints on ﬁrms’
investment choices. Theempirical worktobedevelopedinsubsequentsectionsisbasedontheACWmodel.
A brief review of the original model is presented below.
The ACW model has three periods. In the ﬁrst period the ﬁrm has a cash holding of ￿￿ and has the
chance to invest in a project that costs ￿￿ in the ﬁrst period and returns ￿￿￿￿￿ on the third period. Moreover,
the ﬁrm may have another chance to invest in the second period. Investing ￿￿ in the second period, the
ﬁrm will obtain a return of ￿￿￿￿￿ on the third period. It is important to stress that ￿￿￿￿ and ￿￿￿￿ are
standard production functions (increasing, concave, and continuously differentiable). The ﬁrm will produce
an uncertain cash ￿ow on the second period. The cash ￿ow will be high ￿￿￿
￿￿ with probability ￿ and low
￿￿￿
￿ ￿ ￿￿
￿￿ with probability ￿￿￿￿￿. The discount factor is one, all agents are risk neutral and the investment
costs is one in both periods (1 and 2). The model also supposes that ￿￿ and ￿￿ can be liquidated on the
third period. This case earns a discounted income of ￿￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿, with ￿ ￿ ￿. The total cash ￿ow of the
investments cannot be contracted. The ﬁrm can not pledge the cash ￿ows, but it can raise external ﬁnancial
resourses by pledging the productive assets as collateral.
The model also assumes that the liquidation value of the assets, which can be captured by creditors,
is ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿, where ￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿￿. If ￿ is high, witch means low capacity for external ﬁnance, the ﬁrm may
become ﬁnancially constrained. The ﬁrm must choose the amount of cash to be held from the ﬁrst to the
second period (denoted by ￿). The ﬁnal assumption is that the ﬁrm can hedge all the future earnings at a
fair cost.
If the ﬁrm is unconstrained (with low ￿ and/or high ￿￿ and ￿￿) it will invest in the ﬁrst-best level on
both periods, and its investment policies satisﬁes all ﬁnancial constraints. Moreover, ACW shows that for
unconstrained ﬁrms there are no relationship between changes in cash holding and current cash ￿ow. In
other words, the cash ￿ows of unconstrained ﬁrms does not affect the cash holding policies and therefore it
does not affect investment choices, i. e.,
￿￿
￿￿￿
is indeterminate for ﬁnancially unconstrained ﬁrms.
3If the ﬁrm is constrained the investment will stay below the ﬁrst-best level. Moreover, the cash holdings
will be sensitive to cash ￿ows in a positive way. In other words if a constrained ﬁrm receives an extra
amount of cash on the ﬁrst period, it will distribute these funds across the two periods (saving part of the
money for the second period). That is,
￿￿
￿￿￿
￿ ￿ for ﬁnancially constrained ﬁrms.
In conclusion, this model leads to an important testable prediction. If a ﬁrm is ﬁnancially constrained
the cash holdings will be positively sensitive to cash ￿ows. Otherwise, if the ﬁrm is unconstrained, this
relationship will be is indeterminate. The next section describes the empirical model developed to test this
strong prediction using Brazilian ﬁrms’ data.
3 Empirical Model
Inorder totest the predictionthat cashholdings ofﬁnancial constrainedﬁrms aresensitivetocashwindfalls,
weneedtodistinguishtheﬁrmsbetweentheﬁnancialconstrainedonesandtheﬁnancialunconstrainedones.
This can be accomplished by using a criterium to split the sample. In addition, we will also have to control
for the sensibility of each ﬁrm by the size of the ﬁrm and by each ﬁrm’s opportunities of investments.
These variables were included into the model to take into account two facts. The ﬁrst is related to the scale
economies in cash management, because a larger ﬁrm can better manage the allocation of money in its
activities. The second is that we should control for the investment opportunities because the attractiveness
of the investment may interfere on the choices of the ﬁrms cash holdings.
This last control, however, is very hard to implement, because not only it is is difﬁcult to measure but
also there is no ready proxy variable to use. Following the literature, we will construct a proxy variable well
used by economists: the Tobin’s Q3.
The ﬁrst empirical model can be written as equation (8) of ACW paper, here presented as equation (1).
￿CashHoldings￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿CashFlow￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿Q￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿Size￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿ (1)
where ￿ is the ﬁrm and ￿ is the time. According to the theoretical model ￿￿ is expected to be positive for
constrained ﬁrms and unsigned for unconstrained ﬁrms.
An augmented model was proposed by ACW in order to include other variables to control for traditional
relations present in the cash ￿ow management and investment demand literature. Additionally we control
for variations of non-cash net working cash because it may be a substitute for cash. Moreover, we can use
the variations on short-term debt as a explanatory variable because ﬁrms may use short-term debt to built
cash reserves4. This augmented empirical model, equation (9) in their paper, can be represented as follow:
￿CashHoldings￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿ ￿ ￿￿CashFlow￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿Q￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿Size￿￿￿ (2)
￿ ￿￿Expenditures￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿Acquisitions￿￿￿
￿ ￿￿￿NWC￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿ShortDebt￿￿￿ ￿ ￿￿￿￿
3Almeida, Campello and Weisbach (2003) argue that the use of the Tobin’s Q on regression will not bias our estimative of
cash sensitivity because we are using a ﬁnancial variable as the endogenous variable.
4The literature of investment demand includes for example Fazzari et al (1988), Fazzari and Petersen (1993) and Calomiris et
al. (1995). The cash ￿ow management insighs are taken from the works of Kim et al. (1998), Opler et al. (1999) and Hardford
(1999).
4ACWarguethatthesensitivityofcashcoefﬁcient￿￿￿￿musttobehigherinthislastspeciﬁcationbecause
we are adding controls for alternative uses of cash reserves. In this alternative setup we still expect that
constrained ﬁrms are positively sensitive to cash and the unconstrained are not. The next section describes
the data set available for Brazillian ﬁrms.
4 Data Set
Our data set is composed by 336 non-ﬁnancial companies accounting data. These companies are publicly
traded at São Paulo Stock Exchange (Bovespa). The data range from 1993 to 2002, making a total of 1640
observations (excluding six removed outliers). The source of them is Economática. We used a base of
annual data and all monetary values were taken in American dollars. Our main restriction was the shares
price, because many ﬁrms have their shares traded few times. Moreover, the changes occurred in Brazilian
economy during the 1990’s leads to privatization, mergers, acquisitions and failure of many ﬁrms, therefore
we don’t have accounting data for all companies and for all years.
However, our sample is composed of many important ﬁrms from eighteen different economic sectors,
characterizing a representative sample of the Brazilian economy. Table (1) presents the relative frequency
of the economic sectors represented by our sample.
Using this data base we construct all the variables used to test the ACW propositions. These variables
are presented in the next subsection.
Table 1 - Relative frequency of the ﬁrms by Economic Sector
Economic Sector Relative Frequency (%)
Agric. & Fisheries 0.21









Oil & Gas 2.86
Other 10.58





Vehicle & Parts 6.22
54.1 Variables Constructed
Below, we will present the formulas used to construct variables similar to those used by ACW using the
ﬁrms’ accounting data.
Cash Holdings = Cash + Short-term Financial Investments
Cash Flow= Net Income + Depreciation and Amortization - Dividendes
Acquisitions = Investments in subsidiaries + Inv. in colligateds + Inv. in others
Non-Cash Net Working Capital = Other Short-Term Assets
Short Debt = Short term Debt + Short term Debentures
Q1 = [Total Assets + (Price￿￿.x Quant.￿￿.) – Net Equity] / Total Assets
Q2 = [Total Assets + (Price￿￿.x Quant.￿￿ + Price￿￿ x Quant￿￿.) – Net Equity] / Total Assets
Size = ln (Total Asset)
All the variables, except for Q1, Q2 and size, were scaled by the respective ﬁrm total assets.
4.2 Financial Constraint Criteria
ACW use ﬁve criteria to qualify ﬁrms as ﬁnancial constrained or unconstrained. According to them, the
ﬁrms were qualiﬁed every year based on their:
￿ Payout ratio: assign to the ﬁnancial constrained group those ﬁrms that belong to the bottom three
deciles of the payout ratio distribution and assign to the ﬁnancial unconstrained group the ones that
belong to the top three deciles.
￿ Total assets: assign to the ﬁnancial constrained group those ﬁrms in the bottom three deciles of the
total assets distribution and assign to the ﬁnancial unconstrained group the ones that belong to the top
three deciles.
￿ Bond ratings: ﬁnancially unconstrained ﬁrms are those whose bonds have been rated during the sam-
ple period and ﬁrms which never had their public debt rated during our sample period as ﬁnancially
constrained.
￿ Commercial paper ratings: the ﬁnancially constrained group is composed by those ﬁrms which never
had their issues rated during our sample period and the ﬁrms that issued commercial papers receiving
ratings at some point during the sample period are considered unconstrained.
￿ Kaplan and Zingales rating: an index of ﬁrm ﬁnancial constraints based on results in Kaplan and
Zingales (1997) and separate ﬁrms according to this measure, i. e., assign to the ﬁnancial constrained
group those ﬁrms that belong to the top three deciles of the payout ratio distribution and assign to the
ﬁnancial unconstrained group the ones that belong to the bottom three deciles.
6Only the ﬁrst two of these ﬁve criteria have a straight application for the Brazilian case. The last
criterium is not useful because the Kaplan and Zingales paper were done for American ﬁrms data. After
all, we employed three criteria in our estimations, namely, the ﬁrst two criteria from ACW paper and a third
criterium that is a kind of mix of the third and fourth ACW’s criteria. Our criteria are explained below:
￿ Payout Ratio: assign to the ﬁnancial constrained group those ﬁrms that belong to the bottom three
deciles of the payout ratio distribution and assign to the ﬁnancial unconstrained group the ones that
belong to the top three deciles.
￿ Firm Size: assign to the ﬁnancial constrained group those ﬁrms in the bottom three deciles of the
total assets distribution and assign to the ﬁnancial unconstrained group the ones that belong to the top
three deciles.
￿ Outstanding ADRs: assign to the ﬁnancial constrained group the ﬁrm that does not have outstanding
American Depositary Receipts of its securities, regardless of the level, in United States market in that
year, and assign to the ﬁnancial unconstrained group the ﬁrm that has outstanding ADRs.
Although we are using three criteria we expect that the payout ratio criterium will have a poor perfor-
mance in our estimations. It is generally accepted fact that Brazilian ﬁrms do not pay much dividends and
the split between constrained and unconstrained ﬁrms is the result of the extremely large number of zero
payout observations. In addition, the high real interest rate prevent ﬁrms from contracting long term loans,
either through loans or through debentures. The larger ﬁrms are able to raise funds in foreign markets
whereas the smaller ones may apply for a subdized loan from BNDES. After all, the fact of issuing deben-
tures may not be related to ﬁnancial constraints. Table (2) summarizes the results for the cross-classiﬁcation
of ﬁnancial constrained ﬁrms.
Table 2: Cross-Classiﬁcation of Financial Constrained Firms
Financial Constraint Criteria Payout Ratio Firm Size ADR
(A) (B) (A) (B) (A) (B)
1. Payout Ratio
Constrained Firms (A) 854
Unconstrained Firms (B) 479
2. Firm Size
Constrained Firms (A) 349 66 448
Unconstrained Firms (B) 194 216 471
3. Outstanding ADR
Constrained Firms (A) 765 368 447 315 1288
Unconstrained Firms (B) 89 111 1 156 228
5 Estimation Procedures and Results
The estimation procedure consists in estimate the model using the constrained-ﬁrm and the unconstrained-
ﬁrm samples. The instrumental variables (IV) method will be used to estimate the ﬁrst econometric model
presented in section 3, equation (1), and to estimate the augmented model, equation (2).
7This method was chosen to deal with possible endogeneity problems of the ﬁrm-level accounting vari-
ables. It was also used the Huber/White/sandwich estimator of variance to provide robust estimates of the
coefﬁciestns’ standard errors.
Moreover, as a robustness check, the econometric models will be estimated using the both deﬁnition of
Tobin’s q (Q1 and Q2). It’s important to use Q2 because there is two types of stocks in Brazil (common
and preferred), therefore the ﬁrm’s market value is not only given by the common shares, and this fact may
lead to different results because each ﬁrm has a different amount of preferred shares.
5.1 Basic Model
The ﬁrst empirical exercise consists in estimating equation (1) with our pooled cross-section data divided
into constrained and unconstrained ﬁrms, according to each criterium. The results obtained are presented in
table (3), which reports the IV regression using Q2 output. The instruments used (Group 1) were Cash Flow
(-2), and Size (-1), where (-1) means the ﬁrst lag of the variable. The estimations with other instruments
and the ones using the Q1 variable are reported in the appendix.
In this case our estimatives were not aligned with those obtained by ACW. In fact, for all the three
criteria none of our regressions and their estimated coefﬁcients were statistically signiﬁcant, even using
different mixes of instruments. At a ﬁrst glance these results were unexpected, but our regressions could be
suffering of omitted variables bias, so we preoceeded with the estimation of the augmented model.
Table 3: Baseline Regression Model Using Q2 - IV Estimations
Dependent Variable Independent Variables F-Stat
￿CashHoldings Cash Flow Size Q2
Financial Constraints Criteria
1. Payout Ratio
Constrained Firms 0.317 -1514.6 155.9 1.07
(0.200) (0.519) (0.581) (0.359)
Unconstrained Firms -0.503 -47425 519.8 0.50
(0.340) (0.275) (0.345) (0.683)
2. Firm Size
Constrained Firms –0.503 47425 519.8 0.50
(0.340) (0.275) (0.345) (0.683)
Unconstrained Firms -0.370 86323 4781.5 0.70
(0.487) (0.344) (0.430) (0.550)
3. Outstanding ADR
Constrained Firms -0.245 14513 915.84 0.67
(0.607) (0.365) (0.276) (0.570)
Unconstrained Firms -0.0388 -16541 -82.67 1.77
(0.805) (0.198) (0.202) (0.154)
Instrumented Variables: Cash Flow and Size
Instruments: Cash Flow(-2) and Size(-1) - Group 1
Note: *, **, *** indicate statistical signiﬁcance at, 1-percent, 5-percent and 10 percent (two tail) test levels, respectively.
85.2 Augmented Model
The augmented model, equation (2), was estimated using IV with lagged variables as instruments, namely
Cash Flow (-1), Size (-1), Expenditures (-1), Aqcquisitions.(-1), ￿NWC(-1), and ￿Short Debt(-1). Table
(4) reports the results obtained for the augmented model when the proxy for investment’s opportunities is
Q2. At this time we have got some interesting results. For two out of three criteria the regression output
was the expected result, i. e., the Cash ￿ow coefﬁcient were statistically signiﬁcant for constrained ﬁrms
and not statistically signiﬁcant for the unconstrained ﬁrms.
In this new setup, the Payout Ratio criterium led to non statistically signiﬁcant regressions with both
samples. We suspect that this Payout Ratio is not a very good criterium to distinguish between ﬁnancial
constrained and unconstrained Brazilian ﬁrms, because the payment of dividends is not a common practice
in Brazil, which also stress the credit constraint the Brazilian ﬁrms suffer.
Undertheﬁrmsizecriterium. theestimatedcash￿owsensitivityofcashwas-0.248, andstatisticallysig-
niﬁcant, for constrained ﬁrms whereas this coefﬁcient were not statistically signiﬁcant for the unconstrained
ﬁrms. The intuition for the former result is that for each extraordinary dollar received by constrained ﬁrms,
about a quarter of dollar is invested. Although the sign was not the same as the ACW one, the absolut value
of the estimated coefﬁcient was similar.
Under the Outstanding ADR criterium. the estimated cash ￿ow sensitivity of cash was 0.462, and
statistically signiﬁcant, for constrained ﬁrms whereas this coefﬁcient were not statistically signiﬁcant for
the unconstrained ﬁrms. The intuition for the former result is that for each extraordinary dollar received by
constrained ﬁrms, about a half dollar is saved. The magnitude of the estimated coefﬁcient was similar to
ACW.
Contrary to ACW, we found that ﬁrm size and investment opportunities were not statistically signiﬁcant
in any of the three criteria. The results for the American ﬁrms had shown a positive relation between
ﬁrm size and Cash Holdings Variations, using their criteria. Moreover, the authors ﬁnd a positive relation
between the investments opportunities and cash savings.
We also ran the augmented model with a different set of instruments. The output is presented in the
Appendix. However, the results were similar to those already commented here.
The comparative analysis between samples is important because Brazilian and American ﬁrms face
different institutional arrangement, with relation to ﬁnancial systems. For example, it’s well known that
Brazilian credit market is more restrictive, compared to the American market, in the sense that the ﬁrms
listed on Bovespa are, in general, less constrained than those with private capital strucuture, but they still
face credit constraints. Therefore, our estimatives are aligned with those expected for Brazilian economy.
That is, we expect that Brazilian constrained ﬁrms faces the same credit problems than American con-
strained ﬁrms. It is important to stress that this result does not mean that constrained Brazilian ﬁrms are
less constrained than American ﬁrms.
9Table 4: Augmented Regression Model Using Q2 - IV Estimations
Dependent Variable Independent Variables F-Stat
￿CashHoldings Cash Flow Size Expend. Acquis. ￿NWC ￿Short Debt Q2
Financial Constraints Criteria
1. Payout Ratio
Constrained Firms 0.337 -38325 0.4821 0.02124 -0.964 0.561 -3988 0.53
(0.926) (0.691) (0.553) (0.742) (0.583) (0.780) (0.651) (0.815)
Unconstrained Firms -0.050 15564 -0.106 -0.0018 0.4837 -0.0759 175.76 0.73
(0.926) (0.744) (0.907) (0.809) (0.346) (0.944) (0.596) (0.739)
2. Firm Size
Constrained Firms -0.248 -699.3 0.175 -0.055 0.223 -0.052 -84.52 19.0
(0.044)** (0.311) (0.771) (0.00)* (0.122) (0.132) (0.183) (0.000)*
Unconstrained Firms 0.944 -25110365 -9.636 0.105 -12.51 22.25 121750 0.01
(0.968) (0.972) (0.971) (0.973) (0.973) (0.972) (0.967) (1.0)
3. Outstanding ADR
Constrained Firms 0.462 3361 -1.16 -0.0107 0.358 0.464 644.4 5.37
(0.011)** (0.840) (0.107) (0.040)** (0.404) (0.583) (0.644) (0.000)*
Unconstrained Firms -0.612 2007 0.451 0.004 0.283 -0.135 252.2 0.59
(0.141) (0.926) (0.127) (0.547) (0.544) (0.467) (0.611) (0.767)
Instrumented Variables: Cash Flow, Size, Expend., Aqcquis., ￿NWC, ￿Short Debt
Instruments: Cash Flow(-1), Size(-1), Expend.(-1), Aqcquis.(-1), ￿NWC(-1), and ￿Short Debt(-1)
Notes:a) trend included in all regressions￿ b) *, **, *** indicate statistical signiﬁcance at, 1-percent, 5-percent and 10 percent (two tail) test levels, respectively.
106 Concluding Remarks
The discussion about the effects of ﬁnancial constraints on the ﬁrm decisions of investments is an impor-
tant topic on corporate ﬁnace literature. Many authors have proposed different forms to identify this effect.
Almeida, Campello and Weisbach (2003) developed an interesting framework that avoids most of the problems
faced by models based on the demand for investments.
This workattemptstochecktheestimativesmadebyoriginal authors toAmericaneconomyusingdatafrom
Brazilian public ﬁrms. Our results show that, under speciﬁc ﬁnancial constraint criteria (ﬁrm size), the cash
￿ow sensitivity of cash for Brazilian ﬁrm is positive and statistically signiﬁcative. Therefore, our estimatives
are aligned with those obtained by original authors. That is, we expect that Brazilian constrained ﬁrms face
the same credit problems than American constrained ﬁrms, presenting a positive cash ￿ow sensitivity of cash.
Specially, our results suggest that credit constraints in Brazil are directly related to the size of ﬁrms.
Finally, the evidences provided by our results can be also viewed as a strong evidence that the theoretical
model may be a good representative view of the ﬁnancial decision choices made by ﬁrms.
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12A Appendix
In this appendix we present our OLS estimatives using a second version of the variable proxy for investment
opportunities (Q1) and using a second group of instruments for the IV estimation. Tables (5) to (7) present
results for the Baseline Model using Q1, in the OLS case, and using Q1 and Q2 for the new IV estimation.
Table (8) presents results of the Augmented Model using Q1.
Table 5: Baseline Regression Model Using Q1 - IV Estimations
Dependent Variable Independent Variables F-Stat
￿CashHoldings Cash Flow Size Q1
Financial Constraints Criteria
1. Payout Ratio
Constrained Firms 0.317 -1530 138.32 1.05
(0.200) (0.514) (0.612) (0.369)
Unconstrained Firms -0.503 47357 -45.50 0.52
(0.340) (0.276) (0.894) (0.665)
2. Firm Size
Constrained Firms -0.032 -540.4 -30.44 0.60
(0.547) (0.261) (0.516) (0.614)
Unconstrained Firms -0.371 87516 -6854 0.73
(0.489) (0.352) (0.816) (0.532)
3. Outstanding ADR
Constrained Firms -0.245 14441 866.9 0.67
(0.607) (0.365) (0.256) (0.571)
Unconstrained Firms -0.038 -16644 -223.4 1.58
(0.807) (0.195) (0.337) (0.195)
Instrumented Variables: Cash Flow and Size
Instruments: Cash Flow(-2) and Size(-1) - Group 1
Note: *, **, *** indicate statistical signiﬁcance at, 1-percent, 5-percent and 10 percent (two tail) test levels, respectively.
13Table 6: Baseline Regression Model Using Q1- IV Estimations
Dependent Variable Independent Variables F-Stat
￿CashHoldings Cash Flow Size Q1
Financial Constraints Criteria
1. Payout Ratio
Constrained Firms -0.124 -1987 -240.3 1.21
(0.474) (0.482) (0.539) (0.304)
Unconstrained Firms -0.369 31045 -78.28 0.35
(0.491) (0.444) (0.833) (0.7905)
2. Firm Size
Constrained Firms -0.0695 -855.9 -100.9 0.56
(0.328) (0.246) (0.318) (0.640)
Unconstrained Firms -0.191 39549 2693 0.78
(0.675) (0.573) (0.921) (0.503)
3. Outstanding ADR
Constrained Firms -0.163 9003 761.6 0.54
(0.697) (0.447) (0.281) (0.657)
Unconstrained Firms -0.058 -7076 -78.8 0.71
(0.494) (0.491) (0.647) (0.546)
Instrumented Variables: Cash Flow and Size
Instruments: Cash Flow(-1), Cash Flow(-2), Size(-1) and Size(-2) - Group 2
Note: *, **, *** indicate statistical signiﬁcance at, 1-percent, 5-percent and 10 percent (two tail) test levels, respectively.
14Table 7: Baseline Regression Model Using Q2 - IV Estimations
Dependent Variable Independent Variables F-Stat
￿CashHoldings Cash Flow Size Q2
Financial Constraints Criteria
1. Payout Ratio
Constrained Firms -0.124 -1994 -249.4 1.25
(0.474) (0.481) (0.532) (0.291)
Unconstrained Firms -0.369 31086 363.98 0.32
(0.491) (0.443) (0.418) (0.809)
2. Firm Size
Constrained Firms -0.065 -802.3 -82.9 0.56
(0.333) (0.245) (0.321) (0.642)
Unconstrained Firms -0.191 39217 10140 0.77
(0.673) (0.566) (0.489) (0.513)
3. Outstanding ADR
Constrained Firms -0.163 9054 777.3 0.56
(0.697) (0.447) (0.285) (0.643)
Unconstrained Firms -0.058 -6990 35.95 0.85
(0.492) (0.497) (0.882) (0.470)
Instrumented Variables: Cash Flow and Size
Instruments: Cash Flow(-1), Cash Flow(-2), Size(-1) and Size(-2) - Group 2
Note: *, **, *** indicate statistical signiﬁcance at, 1-percent, 5-percent and 10 percent (two tail) test levels, respectively.
15Table 8: Augmented Regression Model Using Q1- IV Estimations
Dependent Variable Independent Variables F-Stat




Constrained Firms 0.343 -38561 0.484 0.021 -0.972 0.565 -4024 0.52
(0.925) (0.693) (0.554) (0.743) (0.809) (0.781) (0.651) (0.819)
Unconstrained Firms -0.050 15545 -0.106 -0.0018 0.483 -0.0759 6.192 0.61
(0.926) (0.744) (0.907) (0.809) (0.346) (0.944) (0.986) (0.747)
2. Firm Size
Constrained Firms -0.251 -1008 0.247 -0.053 0.210 -0.050 -151.1 20.91
(0.041)** (0.194) (0.688) (0.00)* (0.151) (0.141) (0.075)*** (0.00)*
Unconstrained Firms 0.936 -2595074 -10.06 0.106 -13.12 23.37 -245017 0.01
(0.970) (0.973) (0.973) (0.974) (0.974) (0.973) (0.976) (1.0)
3. Outstanding ADR
Constrained Firms 0.463 3437 -1.16 -0.010 0.359 0.463 799.5 5.35
(0.011)** (0.837) (0.107) (0.040)** (0.404) (0.584) (0.631) (0.00)*
Unconstrained Firms -0.611 1735 0.451 0.0048 0.283 -0.134 -6.987 0.57
(0.141) (0.936) (0.127) (0.546) (0.543) (0.468) (0.979) (0.777)
Instrumented Variables: Cash Flow, Size, Expend., Aqcquis., ￿NWC, ￿Short Debt
Instruments: Cash Flow(-1), Size(-1), Expend.(-1), Aqcquis.(-1), ￿NWC(-1), and ￿Short Debt(-1)
Note: *, **, *** indicate statistical signiﬁcance at, 1-percent, 5-percent and 10 percent (two tail) test levels, respectively.
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